Threshold of Adequacy
Threshold of Adequacy
Monday, July 23, 2007
We strive to be excellent. We aren’t really wired to “just” clear the bar, or be just a little better - we want to do and be the best. Maybe this is an American thing and I am over-generalizing to include the rest of humanity, but hey, I even want my hyperbole to be penultimate.
In technology start-up businesses, this notion of aiming to exceed is gospel. Seldom do we see companies approach us for funding, indicating they intend to solve a customer’s needs just a little better than a current solution. But should this be the goal, or at least the initial goal? In many cases, I think it should.
Entrepreneurs are a smart lot. They interview consumers/customers within their target segments and conduct focus groups, usually done with strong intellectual rigor. But I argue that this type of research and the complementary due diligence conducted by venture capitalists, is usually flawed in its structure. When entrepreneurs approach potential customers to pitch their interpretation of a problem and their approach to solve it, they generally throw a laundry list of value-added features/benefits to gauge reactions. This is exactly where things tend to go awry.
If you tell someone that for 1/2 the price of what they currently pay, you will provide them with 2x the benefits, guess what every single person will say? And when the VCs check on market interest, they will go to those same prospects and ask them, “are you interested in buying service/product A at 1/2 the price of what you currently pay and get 2x the benefits” - what do you think the answer will be? I know I am simplifying the discussion and that smart people will ask smarter questions, but the base point is real. I have observed it in others. And I have observed it in my own actions.
By not asking the right questions, we are making the outcome self-fulfilling. And one truth about innovation in existing markets is that customers may say they want massive improvements, but to get them to buy will likely only take small ones.
Weak example #1: the iPod was hardly the first MP3 player - several preceded it - Diamond RIO, etc. Apple got the UI right, got the software integration right and launched their own store (went vertical).
Weak example #2: Cisco didn’t invent the router and wasn’t first to market (Proteon, DEC and several other defunct companies were earlier). They figured out that the world at that point was multi-protocol and they made a router that was easier to configure - and not higher performance.
Weak example #3: Google wasn’t the most comprehensive search engine out of the gate. They were simpler in their presentation and faster than Yahoo, MSN, Alta Vista, etc. (FAST was probably faster).
I have become convinced that for innovation in existing markets, figuring out the set of “must-have” features and giving 10%+/- more than this “threshold of adequacy,” and hit or reduce schedule, is often the best course of action for a go-to market strategy.
Having been a product guy for a long time, I am not sure how I would react to the direction/advice to reduce a feature set - to make the product “less great.” I guess it would depend on how far behind schedule we were.
But I truly believe that starting with a tactical strategy of getting to market quickly, hitting the adequacy threshold (50-60%?) of all the product/service requirements at a 100% satisfaction level, will result in much better company performance than taking the time to nail 100% of the requirements. In the former case you will be able to create a more intimate dialog with customers sooner, since they will be reacting to a tangible offering instead of slides/mockups and then I am willing to bet the additional features learned from these customers will not be equivalent to the remaining ones left on the original list.
So, maybe one lesson is to aim high, but don’t aim highest; aim higher than the incumbents and learn from the new relationships.